LAWFUEL - The Law News Network: SPEECH AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE BY MR WILLIAM H. DONALDSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE US SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: “For the past few years, much of the media coverage of business has revolved around financial scandals at some prominent, once-respected companies. You all know the list”: “Enron, WorldCom…”: “Over the past 18 months, we have seen many non-U.S. companies… Parmalat… Hollinger… Royal Dutch Shell… and others – accused of managerial fraud, accounting irregularities and other governance abuses.” (ShellNews.net) Posted 26 Jan 05
January 25, 2005 - LAWFUEL - The Law News Network –
As Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, I am obligated
to tell you that the views I express here are my own and do not necessarily
represent those of the Commission or its staff. With that formality aside,
let me begin with an observation that is sometimes heard in discussions
about liberalizing international commerce. Feelings about free trade, it’s
said, are the same as those about heaven – everyone wants to get there,
but just not too quickly!
I want to thank Howard Davies and the London School of Economics and
Political Science for hosting this event, and for giving me the opportunity
to speak today. It is an honor and a pleasure to be at an institution with
such a rich and varied history, serving as a place of study or research for
13 Nobel Prize winners, including Friedrich von Hayek; more than two dozen
heads of state, including John F. Kennedy; and one former student in a
category of his own: Mick Jagger!
We are all familiar with the dramatic expansion of global business and
foreign direct investment in recent years. But less well understood is how
national regulation impacts the world’s securities markets, and the
importance of regulatory coordination and cooperation among the world’s
securities regulators. Given the substantial amount of cross-border
holdings, capital flows, and transactions such as mergers and acquisitions,
all regulators have much to learn from their foreign counterparts.
Indeed, while the SEC is proud of the regulatory system in the United States
and the work we do to maintain and constantly improve it, I am the first to
acknowledge we don’t have all the answers. We are anxious to listen to, and
learn from, ideas advanced by other regulators, which is one reason why the
SEC is an active member of IOSCO, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions. In the same vein, we also seek to hear from all
manner of interested parties, to advance a constructive dialogue and to
maintain strong and vibrant capital markets – in the United States, in
Europe, and throughout the world.
In that spirit I’d like to talk today about a number of pressing issues
facing securities markets throughout the world, with an emphasis on the
comprehensive U.S. corporate-reform law of 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act –
looking at how it’s working, how it affects foreign issuers, and what we’re
doing to ensure a level playing field in the U.S. market for all issuers,
regardless of country of origin.
For the past few years, much of the media coverage of business has revolved
around financial scandals at some prominent, once-respected companies. You
all know the list: Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Health South, Tyco, Global
Crossing, Cendant and others. In the beginning, these financial scandals
appeared to be primarily an American phenomenon — perhaps a result of
overheated U.S. stock markets, excessive greed, and a winner-take-all
business mindset. More recently, however, it has become clear that U.S.
companies were not alone when it came to scandals. Over the past 18 months,
we have seen many non-U.S. companies – Parmalat, Vivendi, Hollinger, Ahold,
Adecco, TV Azteca, Royal Dutch Shell, Seibu, China Aviation, and others –
accused of managerial fraud, accounting irregularities and other governance
abuses.
Related to these disclosures of alleged gross corporate malfeasance, there
was also a more widespread erosion of standards throughout our markets, with
questionable practices becoming accepted and ethical corners being cut on a
too frequent basis. The net effect has been to undermine the faith investors
have in the integrity of the world’s capital markets. When investors buy
shares in a company or purchase its debt securities, they must have faith
that the company’s financial statements have been prepared using
high-quality accounting standards designed to accurately reflect the
company’s financial condition. If investors don’t have this faith, they will
insist on a risk premium for their investment. The cost of capital will
increase for these companies, with the obviously negative impact on
investment and employment decisions.
As it becomes extremely time-consuming for investors to distinguish the good
from the bad, they will tend to invest in other markets or perhaps not
invest at all. This is of particular concern in the U.S., at a time when
more than half of all our households have some equity ownership, and
investment decisions on the deployment of retirement funds are increasingly
being delegated to individual beneficiaries. It must also be of concern for
investors, businesses, and regulators throughout the world.
Different countries have responded differently to the problems in the
world’s securities markets, but what’s significant is that there has been a
global recognition of the need for reforms. This is critical, because simply
fixing problems in only one market can result in their reappearance in other
markets. Through multilateral cooperation we can not just learn from each
other, but also raise standards throughout our markets, and ensure that
investors everywhere have the protections they need and deserve.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The American response to the problems I’ve just outlined came in 2002, when
the U.S. Congress and President Bush enacted the law which became known as
Sarbanes-Oxley. The Act is the most significant piece of securities
legislation passed since the securities acts of 1933 and ‘34, the latter of
which created the Securities and Exchange Commission itself. Sarbanes-Oxley
created a new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee the audit
profession. It created new rules to protect auditor independence and address
conflicts of interest faced by securities analysts. It increased the
penalties for financial fraud and gave the SEC additional resources. The act
also instituted other important safeguards, such as requiring issuer CEOs
and CFOs to certify the company’s financial statements, and mandating that
auditors certify the adequacy of the issuer’s internal controls.
Now, two-and-a-half years later, some critics claim the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
goes too far. In particular, these critics charge that requiring
certification of internal controls — the so-called Section 404 provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley — is too expensive and unnecessary. Section 404 has even led
some foreign issuers to declare that they may wish to leave America’s
capital markets altogether rather than have their internal controls
certified.
It is easy for an individual issuer to look at the cost of compliance with
U.S. federal securities laws and balk. But the cost of capital also comes
with benefits. U.S. capital markets are deep and liquid. Nearly half of all
the world’s equity shares, by market capitalization, trade in the United
States. And non-U.S. investors have approximately $4.5 trillion invested in
U.S. stock markets.
Since the 1930s, the U.S. has required some of the most extensive financial
disclosures, backed up by one of the most robust enforcement regimes of any
jurisdiction in the world. As a result, the average person in the United
States who saves even a little money doesn’t feel that the only realistic
investment opportunity is a government-insured savings account. Educated
investors recognize that investing in the stock market entails risk, but the
U.S. government has worked to ensure there is a range of investor
protections and a level playing field. These laws, regulations, and
enforcement activities make the U.S. capital markets attractive to foreign
investors.
A First-Class Market
The requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley cannot be evaluated in a vacuum. They are
important because they have produced, and will produce, improvements that
help to restore and reinforce investor confidence in our markets, and lower
the cost of capital to issuers. Section 404, for example, reaffirms that
U.S. legislators are serious about internal control requirements. It is
already clear that Section 404 is helping to strengthen the business
operations of those U.S. and foreign issuers who have seized the opportunity
to use the internal controls assessment as a managerial opportunity and not
simply a compliance exercise.
The disclosures that have been, and will be, made under Section 404 involve
facts that investors should know about a company when making an investment
decision. But these are also facts that management and the board of
directors should know about the companies for which they have
responsibility.
This discussion of Section 404 is a reminder of the need for high standards
in securities markets throughout the world. The overwhelming majority of
investors – regardless of their nationality and regardless of where they’re
investing – demand honesty and integrity. They demand that boards of
directors take their fiduciary duties seriously. They demand that companies
have the internal controls they need in order to ensure the accuracy of
their financial disclosures. And when there is fraud or where securities
laws or regulations are violated, investors rightly expect regulatory
authorities to aggressively pursue enforcement action.
All capital markets talk of honesty and integrity. Full, accurate, and
timely disclosure of material information is a “core principle” of IOSCO.
Strong fiduciary obligations for corporate managers and directors are now
enshrined within the OECD’s Principles for Corporate Governance.
These measures are helping to raise standards throughout the world, but I
still believe there are distinct benefits to listing on a U.S. exchange and
registering with the Commission. I’d like to explain why by drawing a
parallel to the U.S. Marine Corps, which shares some characteristics with
the Royal Marines here in Great Britain. Of all the U.S. armed services, the
Marine Corps has the longest and most intensive basic training for both its
officers and enlisted personnel. The Corps is upfront about its grueling
physical and mental drill. But it has no problem meeting its recruitment
goals. The reason is simple: the Marines are an elite – the best of the
best.
That is what we want the U.S. market to represent as well. We want listing
and registration in the United States, with its extensive requirements, to
signal that the issuer is committed to the highest standards. We also seek
to have a listing in the U.S. signify to investors throughout the world that
this company is willing to make the investment needed to meet these
standards. Companies who choose not to come to the United States may meet
those same standards – but our registrants have taken the extra step of
telling the world that they are up to the challenges that accompany a U.S.
listing.
It is entirely consistent with the principles underpinning Sarbanes-Oxley
reforms to also evaluate whether the rules and regulations we write to
implement these principles are effective and appropriate. Have rules been
implemented the right way? What are the relative costs and benefits? Are
there certain situations in which rules should not apply? Or where old rules
have been outmoded or are in need of revision? For instance, we have
recently proposed reforms to the rules governing the “quiet period” in the
weeks preceding initial public offerings, reflecting the advances made in
modern communications methods, such as the Internet. There are many other
areas where we have acknowledged the need for updating and modifying rules,
and there are also examples related to non-U.S. issuers.
Going Forward
In this same vein, the SEC has worked from its earliest days to accommodate
foreign issuers, and to facilitate their access to our markets. In 1935,
just one year after the SEC’s creation, the Commission issued a rule
exempting foreign companies from our rules governing both proxy statements
and reports by insiders of transactions in their company’s securities. More
recently, many issuers have raised excellent points and real concerns about
how Sarbanes-Oxley will be implemented in practice, and how this
implementation may affect those who are listed in more than one jurisdiction
and who operate under more than one set of rules.
The SEC remains committed to a level playing field for all its issuers,
foreign and domestic alike. But we recognize that cross-border listings
frequently entail issuers having to navigate duplicative or even
contradictory regulations in different jurisdictions. While the SEC is
unwilling to compromise where investor protections are concerned, some
duplicative or contradictory regulations can compromise those protections
and place an unnecessary burden on issuers, firms and investors.
I want to emphasize that the SEC is determined to avoid such situations,
where possible. We have demonstrated our willingness to work with foreign
regulators and market participants to reduce the likelihood of this
occurring and continuing uncorrected. One recent example is the SEC’s rule
regarding the composition of audit committees of listed issuers.
Sarbanes-Oxley required the SEC to pass a rule mandating that all members of
audit committees be independent directors. But the corporate governance laws
and regulations in Germany for instance, and a few other countries with dual
board systems, require corporate audit committees to include a labor
representative. SEC rules do not, however, consider employees of an issuer
“independent” for fear that an unscrupulous corporate officer could appoint
employees to the board who were beholden to the company’s management.
Following a dialogue with the European Union and others, the SEC was
reassured that in those jurisdictions with dual boards, the mandatory labor
representatives on issuer audit committees were firmly independent of the
company’s management. The resulting final rule relating to audit committees
contained an exception for these jurisdictions that would allow employees
who are not officers of a company to sit on the audit committee. This
enables the affected issuers to comply with both sets of law. And it
preserves the intent of Sarbanes-Oxley – to ensure that independent
directors can communicate directly with auditors without management
interference.
Another example of the SEC seeking to accommodate the special circumstances
of foreign issuers came with our rules related to the publication of
financial information presented in ways not strictly in compliance with U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP. In this area, we included
an exemption for non-GAAP communications outside the U.S., even where those
communications reach the U.S. We took this action because we did not want to
interfere with the regular practices governing how foreign companies
communicated with investors in non-U.S. markets.
A third example of accommodation is our work with the new Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board to iron out some issues regarding oversight of
foreign audit firms. Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, all audit firms,
including non-US audit firms, providing significant audit services for
issuers listed in the United States, are required to be registered and
inspected by the PCAOB. Because of potential conflicts with foreign privacy
laws and blocking statutes, the PCAOB has made some adjustments in the
information requested of foreign firms during the registration process. In
addition, the PCAOB is seeking a collaborative approach to developing its
oversight role vis-à-vis non-U.S. audit firms, working with counterparts in
Europe and elsewhere.
We welcome continued input from the foreign issuer community as well as from
our regulatory counterparts in other jurisdictions. In the short term, I
expect several initiatives that should ease some of the concerns that
foreign private issuers may have about the reforms now being implemented in
U.S. markets.
First, I expect the SEC to consider whether there should be a new approach
to the deregistration process for foreign private issuers if they do not
feel prepared to meet the U.S. requirements. U.S. federal securities laws
and regulations on this issue were designed many years ago, before there was
much in the way of cross-border listings. While the rules were designed to
protect investors, we should seek a solution that will preserve investor
protections without inappropriately designing the U.S. capital market as one
with no exit. We recognize that issuer circumstances change, and that
foreign private issuers should have the flexibility to respond to these
changes.
Second, the Commission also recognizes the seismic change that conversion to
IFRS represents for many European countries. We appreciate the European
Union’s efforts in this area because we value the EU’s willingness to
require the use of a single set of high quality accounting standards. This
approach enhances investor understanding. We also understand that conversion
to IFRS, while undoubtedly beneficial in the long run, could be difficult
and expensive for some to implement in the immediate term. Consequently, the
Commission has proposed amendments to our reporting requirements that would
facilitate foreign private issuers’ conversion to IFRS. For those foreign
issuers also listed on U.S. exchanges, the SEC has long allowed these
companies to use IFRS, provided the financial figures were reconciled to
U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles over a three-year period.
Within the next few months, I fully expect the Commission will consider
adopting a proposal to allow first-time users of IFRS to reconcile their
financial statements to U.S. GAAP for only two years, and I am of the firm
view that this would be a step in the right direction.
Third, the SEC recently extended the deadline for smaller accelerated filers
– issuers in the United States with market capitalization between 75 and
$700 million – to come into compliance with SEC rules implementing Section
404 of Sarbanes-Oxley. We pursued this course of action because we
understand there are limited resources available to comply with these
internal control requirements, which may be disproportionately expensive for
companies with fewer resources to devote to compliance and their internal
controls.
Though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not provide an exemption for foreign
private issuers, we will continue to be sensitive to the need to accommodate
unique foreign structures and requirements. Many non-U.S. companies and
their auditors are well on their way to completing the processes necessary
to report on internal controls. Of all the reforms contained in the Act,
getting these processes right is likely to have the greatest long-term
impact on enhancing the reliability of financial reporting. However, many
companies outside the U.S., especially in Europe, face additional challenges
in the near term that go above and beyond those faced by U.S. companies as
European companies adopt international financial reporting standards for the
first time in 2005.
To address these burdens, I have asked the staff of the Commission to
consider whether to recommend that we delay the effective date of the
internal control on financial reporting requirements for non-U.S. companies.
We will continue to monitor progress in these areas and we are prepared to
reach out and engage in an open dialogue to address concerns regarding
reporting on internal controls.
Conclusion
There are, of course, many other important issues looming on the
international landscape, but the fundamental issue for everyone involved in
financial markets today, regardless of company or country, must be to
maintain high standards – legal, regulatory, and ethical – that breed trust
and confidence. This becomes increasingly important at a time when money
managers can move capital around the globe with a few clicks on a computer.
Capital will flee environments that are unstable or unpredictable – whether
that’s a function of lax corporate governance, ineffective accounting
standards, a lack of transparency, or a weak enforcement regime. Investors
must see for themselves that companies are living up to their obligations
and embracing the spirit underpinning all securities laws. Only then will
the place of the world’s securities markets as an engine of prosperity be
assured – in America, in Europe, and throughout the world.
Thank you.